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This article analyses the interaction between the application of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters and the right to liberty. The main argument is that the current content of the right to liberty 
in EU law is unsuitable for mutual recognition procedures. As for the structure of this article, firstly, 
the main features of mutual recognition as a method of inter-state cooperation in criminal matters 
are outlined. Secondly, the approach of the Union (especially the Court of Justice) to the right to 
liberty is clarified. Thirdly, four mutual recognition instruments are analysed in light of the right to 
liberty: namely, the Framework Decisions on the European Arrest Warrant, the Transfer of 
Prisoners, the Probation Measures and the European Supervision Order. The assessment confirms 
that the higher level of automaticity in judicial cooperation introduced by mutual recognition 
requires a rethink of the existing understanding of the right to liberty in EU law.    
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I. Introduction 
Mutual recognition has constituted a great challenge to fundamental rights protection in European 
Union (EU) law. “Borrowed” from the law of the internal market, this principle implies that a 
judicial order issued in one Member State is recognised and executed in another Member State 
without further formality. By doing so, it is meant to substitute the previous system of extradition in 
inter-state cooperation in criminal matters. The implications in terms of fundamental rights – and 
the right to liberty in particular - are manifold. Firstly, the higher level of automaticity brought 
about by mutual recognition rests on a legal fiction. This fiction is the principle of mutual trust, i.e. 
the presumption that Member States respect fundamental rights throughout the Union. Not 
surprisingly, such a presumption has been highly contested over the last years, not the least because 
of important judgments showing how critical this fiction can be.1  
                                                     
* PhD in Law, Research Associate, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. 
1 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, (Application no. 30696/09) (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 2; N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, C-411/10, and M.E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, C-493/10, EU:C:2011:865. See E Brouwer, ‘Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in 
the EU and the Burden of Proof’ (2013) 9 (1) Utrecht Law Review 135; V Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) 31 (1) 
Yearbook of European Law 319. 
Secondly, mutual recognition is mainly meant to enforce judicial decisions against individuals, with 
strong emphasis being placed on state demands. This has led to paying higher attention to 
effectiveness of judicial cooperation at the expenses of individual rights protection.2 We have seen 
this especially in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU or the Luxembourg Court) 
on the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD).3 Thirdly, there are a number of 
mutual recognition instruments in EU law involving deprivation of liberty. Automaticity and 
effectiveness place the right to liberty under pressure, so that its content and protection in the Union 
have to be carefully assessed. In this article I analyse the relationship between the right to liberty in 
EU law and the FDs on: the EAW,4 the transfer of prisoners (2008/909/JHA),5 probation measures 
(2008/947/JHA),6 pre-trial measures alternative to detention (2009/829/JHA, or ESO FD).7 The 
main hypothesis is that the application of mutual recognition to criminal law results in the need to 
redefine the current content of the right to liberty at EU law level. In order to verify the hypothesis, 
I structure the article into three parts. In the first part (II), I set the ground, by outlining the 
principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust, on the one hand, and the right to liberty in EU 
law, on the other. With regard to the right to liberty, I distinguish between a “default right to 
liberty” and an “evolutionary right to liberty”. In this first part I address the “default right to 
liberty”, as shaped by: The Charter of the Fundamental Rights EU (CFREU or the Charter) and its 
Explanations;8 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the European 
Courts of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Strasbourg Court). As clarified by the Explanations, the 
CFREU and ECHR relevant provisions on the right to liberty have the same meaning and scope. 
The “evolutionary right to liberty” is the product of the interaction between the “default right to 
liberty” and its interpretation of the CJEU in the context of mutual recognition. As the evolutionary 
right to liberty logically presupposes the default right to liberty, I deal with the latter in the first 
part, and focus on the former in the second part of this article. In any case, the right of liberty in EU 
law and the ECHR firstly – and most importantly – requires that deprivation of liberty be carried 
out in the cases and according to the procedures established by the law.  
                                                     
2 V Mitsilegas, ‘Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights After Lisbon’ in V Mitsilegas et al. (eds), Research 
Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Edward Elgar, 2016), pp. 148-177; V Mitsilegas, ‘The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual 
Trust and Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ (2015) 7 (4) New Journal of European Criminal Law 457. 
3 Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan, C-237/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:474, para 28; Melvin West, C-192/12 PPU, 
EU:C:2012:404, para 54; Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, para 36; Jeremy F. v Premier ministre, C-
168/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:358, para 34. 
4 Council Framework Decision (JHA) No 584/2002 [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
5 Council Framework Decision (JHA) No 909/2008 [2008] OJ L 327/27. 
6 Council Framework Decision (JHA) No 947/2008 [2008] OJ L 337/102. 
7 Council Framework Decision (JHA) No 829/2009 [2009] OJ L 294/20.  
8 Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Explanations related to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
In the second part (III), I shall analyse the four FDs that are relevant to the right to liberty, as well 
as the interpretation given by the CJEU. I highlight the criticality both in the legislation and in the 
case-law, and show the unbalanced relationship between the smoothness of judicial cooperation, on 
the one hand, and the level of protection of the right to liberty, on the other. I focus in particular on 
two flaws of the current content of the right to liberty in EU law. Firstly, the FDs lay down a legal 
framework that lacks legal certainty. If deprivation of liberty shall be carried out in the cases and 
according to the procedures established by the law, the rules authorising (the cases) and governing 
(the procedures) deprivation of liberty must be clear, accessible and foreseeable. Secondly, the right 
to liberty in EU law seems not to take into account detention conditions and penitentiary regimes. 
However, I submit that the concept of established procedures required by the right to liberty should 
also include these aspects. Indeed, requiring that ‘one shall be deprived of liberty in accordance 
with a procedure established by law’ logically involves the phase of enforcement: so long as 
deprivation of liberty is ongoing, clear and accessible legal procedures must apply. 
In conclusion (IV), I argue that the application of mutual recognition to criminal matters requires 
the definition of a new EU test for the right to liberty, capable of balancing the shortcomings 
described.  
 
II. Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters and the Right to Liberty in EU Law 
 
A. Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust in EU Law 
As known, mutual recognition in criminal matters is a principle borrowed from the law of the 
internal market, where it was introduced by the Cassis de Dijon judgment of the CJEU.9 It requires 
that a product lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State, should be capable of being 
marketed into another Member State, unless grounds for refusal apply.10 The 1999 Tampere 
Council adopted the principle of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. In criminal law, mutual recognition is used to step up judicial cooperation 
between Member States within the EU: according to this principle, a judicial order issued by one 
Member State is to be recognised and executed by another Member State, save where grounds for 
refusal apply. However, the principle of mutual recognition had already been applied to judicial 
                                                     
9 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), C-120/78, EU:C:1979:42; K Armstrong ‘Mutual 
Recognition’ in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market. Unpacking the Premises, (Hart Publishing, 
2002), pp. 225-268; J Snell ‘The Internal Market and the Philosophies of Market Integration’ in C Barnard and S Peers (eds), 
European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 300-323. 
10 A Rosas ‘Life after Dassonville and Cassis: Evolution but No Revolution’ in M Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future 
of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 433-446; C 
Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 4th edition (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 171–177; C Janssen, 
The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law, (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 31 onwards. 
cooperation in civil justice, where a number of international law instruments had been adopted over 
the previous decades.11 Examples in this respect are the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction 
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the 1988 Lugano 
Convention, which extended the application of the Brussels Convention to certain States members 
of the European Free Trade Association.12 
The principle of mutual recognition streamlines the previous system of extradition, by introducing a 
higher level of automaticity in inter-state cooperation in criminal matters.13 It does so by means of 
three main novelties: firstly, it abolishes the principle of dual criminality (although not in all cases); 
secondly, it allocates the responsibility for the surrender on judicial rather than political authorities; 
thirdly, it (almost completely) drops the prohibition for a state to extradite its own nationals (also 
referred to as ‘nationality exception’ or ‘nationality ban’).14 The cooperation on a given order 
(arrest warrant, probation measure, custodial sentence and the like) is regulated by specific 
legislative instruments adopted at EU law level. In the cases analysed in this article, the recognition 
of the judicial decision results in the coercive transfer of the person concerned from the issuing 
Member State to the executing Member State. The application of mutual recognition to criminal law 
has drawn criticism over the years, with major concerns being voiced towards the inadequate level 
of individual safeguards.15  
Indeed, mutual recognition in criminal matters (and not only) implies the extraterritoriality of 
Member States’ rules and standards, as well as a higher level of automaticity in judicial 
cooperation.16 This may happen only in the context of a general feeling of mutual trust among 
Member States.17 Broadly speaking, mutual trust refers to a sociological perspective, which sees 
trust as a tool to deal with social complexity, when there are certain values shared within a 
                                                     
11 Council Draft Programme of measures for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and 
commercial matters [2001] OJ C 12/1, pp. 2 onwards.  
12 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [1968] OJ L 299/32. 
13 For a diachronic analysis, see S Miettinen, ‘Onward Transfer under the European Arrest Warrant: Is the EU Moving Towards the 
Free Movement of Prisoners?’ (2013) 5 (1) New Journal of European Criminal Law 99. 
14 M Fichera, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?’ (2009) 15 (1) European Law 
Journal 79; M Platcha, ‘Non-Extradition of Nationals: A Never-Ending Story?’ (1999) 13 (1) Emory International Law Review 77; Z 
Deen-Racsmány and R Blekxtoon, ‘The Decline of the Nationality Exception in European Extradition? The Impact of the Regulation 
of (Non-) Surrender of Nationals and Dual Criminality under the European Arrest Warrant’ (2005) 13 (3) European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 317. 
15 G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen et al (eds), The Future of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the European Union (Editions 
de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009); V Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the 
EU’ (2006) 43 (5) Common Market Law Review 1277; S Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: Has 
the Council Got It Wrong?’ (2004) 41 (1) Common Market Law Review 5; S Lavenex, ‘Mutual Recognition and the Monopoly of 
Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy’ (2007) 14 (5) Journal of European Public Policy 762.  
16 On mutual recognition and extraterritoriality, see K Nicolaidis and G Shaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance without Global Government’ (2005) 68 (3) Law and Contemporary Problems 263. 
17 W. J. G. Bauhuis v The Netherlands State, C-46/76, EU:C:1977:6; Criminal proceedings against Esther Renée Bouchara, née 
Wurmser, and Norlaine SA, C-25/88, EU:C:1989:187; The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley 
Lomas (Ireland), C-5/94, EU:C:1996:205. 
community, so as to create expectation of regular and honest behaviour.18 In EU criminal law, 
mutual trust rests on the presumption that Member States act in compliance with fundamental 
rights.19 To this end, Article 6 Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that the Charter has the 
same value as the Treaty, on the one hand; on the other, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union law.20  
In the context of this threefold system of fundamental rights protection (CFREU, ECHR, national 
traditions), the importance of mutual recognition materialises at three levels: a vertical perspective, 
which raises the issue as to which kind of fundamental rights standard should be applied (that of the 
Union or that of the Member State); a horizontal dimension, posing the question as to whether a 
presumption of compliance with fundamental rights by the Member State may be maintained; the 
EU level, where a Union norm is reviewed against the yardstick of fundamental rights. In the 
vertical dimension, the most problematic issue has regarded so far the definition of the scope of 
application of the Charter: whether it binds Member States when they implement EU law (as stated 
in Article 51(1) CFREU), or when they act in the scope of Union law (according to the wording of 
the Explanations).21 A heated debate flourished, fuelled by highly contested judgments of the Court 
of Justice.22 The horizontal dimension takes the shape of the duty, for the executing Member State, 
to recognise the standard of fundamental rights protection of the issuing Member State as 
equivalent to its own standard.23 However, the CJEU has found that this presumption is a refutable 
one, and that a conclusive presumption would be incompatible with EU law.24 As shown below, the 
                                                     
18 N Luhmann, La Fiducia (il Mulino, 2002); F Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity (Penguin, 
1995); G Majone (ed), Regulating Europe (Routledge, 1996). 
19 D Flore, ‘La Notion de Confiance Mutuelle: L’ “alpha” Ou L’ “oméga” D’une Justice Pénale Européenne?’ in G De Kerchove and 
A Weyembergh (eds), La Confiance Mutuelle Dans L’espace Pénal Européen - Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area 
(Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2005), pp. 17–28; V. Mitsilegas, see note 1 above. 
20 S Douglas-Scott, ‘The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 11 (4) Human Rights Law Review 
645; F Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
21 See, among many, A Knook, ‘The Court, the Charter and the Vertical Division of Powers in the European Union’ (2005) 42 (2) 
Common Market Law Review 367; K Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 (03) 
European Constitutional Law Review 375; J H H Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 (8) Yale Law Journal 2403; P  
Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 (5) Common Market Law Review 945. 
22 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107; Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105; Cruciano 
Siragusa v Regione Sicilia - Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo, C-206/13, EU:C:2014:126. F Fontanelli, 
‘Implementation of EU Law through Domestic Measures after Fransson: the Court of Justice Buys Time and “Non-preclusion” 
Troubles Loom Large’ (2014) 39 (5) European Law Review 782; L Besselink, ‘The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after 
Melloni’ (2014) 39 (4) European Law Review 531; A Torres Pérez, ‘Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue’ (2014) 10 
(2) European Constitutional Law Review 308; G Cavallone, ‘European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental Rights in Decisions 
Rendered in Absentia: The Extent of Union Law in the Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal’ (2014) 4 (1) European Criminal 
Law Review 19; N de Boer, ‘Addressing Rights Divergences under the Charter: Melloni’ (2013) 50 (4) Common Market Law Review 
1083. 
23 See in particular Criminal proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus Brügge, C-187/01 and C-385/01, EU:C:2003:87, para 
33. 
24 See N. S. and M. E., EU:C:2011:865, para 190. 
Court has recently confirmed this approach in the Caldararu judgment.25 In this case, the 
Luxembourg judge acknowledged the possibility to postpone and non-implement the EAW FD, 
where there is a serious risk that the person concerned will be subject to inhumane treatment in the 
issuing Member State. The third scenario concerns the possible review of EU law against the 
benchmark of fundamental rights. Here, the compliance of EU norms with fundamental rights is at 
stake. For the purposes of this paper, the Advocaten voor de Wereld case is worth referring to.26 The 
Court upheld the compatibility of the EAW FD with Article 6(2) TEU, and in particular with the 
principle of legality. The CJEU argued that the aim of the FD is to provide Member States with a 
procedural instrument, and not to harmonize national regimes of substantive criminal law. Indeed, 
it is still for Member States to define criminal offences and related penalties.27 
Having set the broader ground on the legal framework concerning fundamental rights protection 
(with specific regard to mutual recognition in criminal matters), now I present the content of the 
benchmark adopted, namely the right to liberty in EU law. 
 
B. The Right to Liberty in Europe 
Article 6 CFREU is devoted to the right to liberty, according to which ‘Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of the person’. According to the Praesidium’s Explanations to the Charter, 
Articles 6 CFREU and 5 ECHR have the same meaning and scope.28 Article 5 ECHR states that 
‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’. Among the 
justified cases of deprivation of liberty, Article 5(1)(f) features ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a 
person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom 
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’. This is the ground regarding inter-
state cooperation in criminal matters. As I show below, Article 5(1)(f) – and its interpretation 
provided by the Strasbourg Court - are the fundamental right references used by the CJEU to assess 
the right to liberty in the context of mutual recognition procedures. The ECtHR has interpreted 
                                                     
25 Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198. 
26 G De Burca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?’ (2013) 20 (2) 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 13; F Fontanelli, ‘National Measures and the Application of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights – Does Curia.eu Know Iura.eu?’ (2014) 14 (2) Human Rights Law Review 231; F Fontanelli, ‘The 
Implementation of European Union Law by Member States Under Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2014) 20 (2) 
Columbia Journal of European Law 194. 
27 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, C-303/05, EU:C:2007:261, paras 53 and 59. F Geyer, ‘European 
Arrest Warrant: Advocaten Voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad’ (2008) 4 (1) European Constitutional Law Review 
149; D Leczykiewicz, ‘Constitutional Conflicts and the Third Pillar’ (2008) 33 (2) European Law Review 230; E Cloots, ‘Germs of 
Pluralist Judicial Adjudication: Advocaten Voor de Wereld and Other References from the Belgian Constitutional Court’ (2010) 47 
(3) Common Market Law Review 645; D Sarmiento, ‘European Union: The European Arrest Warrant and the Quest for 
Constitutional Coherence’ (2008) 6 (1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 171. 
28 CFREU, Article 52(7). 
Article 5(1)(f) in the sense that deprivation of liberty is lawful (not arbitrary) where it is: carried out 
in good faith; closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the executing judicial 
authority; enforced in appropriate place and conditions; reasonably lengthy in relation to the 
purposes pursued. The Strasbourg Court does not require that decision on deprivation of liberty in 
this context be necessary and proportionate, but only that extradition procedures be ongoing and 
carried out with due diligence.29 
In the context of mutual recognition, the issuing and executing judges have been seen as exempt 
from the duty of carrying out the proportionality test, when issuing or executing a judicial order. 
This has drawn the attention of the scholarship, EU institutions and practitioners.30 With specific 
regard to the position of the issuing judge in relation to the EAW, the Council found that, although 
the proportionality check does not constitute a legal obligation on the issuing Member State, the 
competent authorities have to evaluate the proportionality between the aim of the surrender and the 
fundamental rights implications. It has been argued that imposing an obligation of this kind on the 
issuing judge would be difficult, since a major difference exists between two groups of Member 
States: on the one hand, there are those Member States which feature the principle of legality in 
their systems of criminal justice (the obligation to investigate and prosecute all criminal offences);31 
on the other hand, a minor number of states applies the opportunity principle, according to which 
the national judiciary retains a certain margin of discretion in this regard.32 Therefore, requiring a 
proportionality test to the former group of states would significantly affect their legal systems. 
Besides, the case may be that Member States applying the legality principle suffer from over-
criminalisation and extensive use of harsh custodial penalties, which in turn are capable of 
triggering the issuing of a EAW. The combination of these three elements (mandatory prosecution, 
diffuse criminalisation and frequent recourse to high levels of imprisonment) makes the 
introduction of a binding proportionality test rather difficult. Some authors have also argued that ‘in 
                                                     
29 R White and C Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp. 122 onwards; C Grabenwarter, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: A Commentary, 1st Edition (Beck/Hart Publishing, 2014), pp. 60 onwards; A Mowbray, Cases and Materials on The 
European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 245 onwards.  
30 J Vogel and J R Spencer, ‘Proportionality and the European Arrest Warrant’ (2010) 56 (6) Criminal Law Review 474; E Herlin-
Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 2012); N Keijzer and E van Sliedregt (eds), The 
European Arrest Warrant in Practice (T. M. C. Asser Press, 2005); E Xanthopoulou, ‘The Quest for Proportionality for the European 
Arrest Warrant’ (2015) 5 (1) New Journal of European Criminal Law 32; D Helenius, ‘Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters and 
the Principle of Proportionality. Effective Proportionality or Proportionate Effectiveness?’ (2014) 5 (3) New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 349. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation since 2007 of 
the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States, Brussels, 11.4.2011 COM (2011) 175 final; Council doc 17195/1/10 REV1, 17 December 2010; Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, Brussels, 11.4.2011 COM(2011) 175 final.  
31 For instance, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Croatia, Poland. 
32 E.g. Belgium, France, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom. 
certain cases, the problem of disproportionate EAWs is self-regulatory’.33 The Council’s Handbook 
and the 2011 Commission Evaluation Report urged Member State to deal with the issue of 
disproportionate EAWs. Following these recommendations, Poland has adopted legislative reforms 
to make the national regime in compliance with the principle of proportionality. Growing attention 
to proportionality concerns in mutual recognition is confirmed by Directive 2014/41/EU, which 
makes the issuance of a European Investigation Order subject to an assessment in terms of necessity 
and proportionality.34 It should also be noted that the UK amended the Extradition Act 2003 (which 
implements the EAW FD) in 2014, by inserting section 21A, entitled ‘Person not convicted: human 
rights and proportionality’. According to this amendment, the judge called on to execute a EAW is 
to determine whether the surrender (the text uses the word ‘extradition) would be disproportionate, 
by taking into account the seriousness of the offence, the likely penalty that would be imposed, the 
possibility of the relevant foreign authorities taking measures that would be less coercive than the 
extradition. The judge must order discharge, should s/he make the decision that the surrender would 
be disproportionate. 
Another important feature of the right to liberty regards legal certainty. Such a right stipulates that 
deprivation of liberty is to be carried out in the cases and according to the procedures established 
by the law. This requires that the legal basis authorising and regulating deprivation of liberty be of 
sufficient quality: clear and accessible legislative provisions are to be laid down. Broadly-worded 
rules allowing for detention, or vague norms establishing procedures for deprivation of liberty may 
thus result in a violation of the right.35 As I show below, the FDs involving deprivation of liberty 
leave much to be desired in terms of legal certainty, so resulting in serious concerns over the 
protection of the right to liberty in EU law.  
Thirdly, mutual recognition brings to the fore the issue of the actual scope of the right to liberty. 
The higher level of automaticity introduced by mutual recognition calls for an enhanced level of 
protection of individual rights. In particular, the question arises as to what situations should be 
included in the scope of the requirement that deprivation of liberty be carried out in the cases and 
according to the procedures established by the law. The cases are those situations that can lawfully 
result in deprivation of liberty. As shown below, mutual recognition of pre and post-trial measures 
alternative to detention result in the transfer of the person from one state to another. However, the 
national regimes on these measures vary considerably throughout the EU. This has to do, mostly, 
with the consequences ensuing from the breach of these pre or post trial measures: one state may 
                                                     
33 A Weyembergh, I Armada, C Brière, ‘European Added Value Assessment The EU Arrest Warrant. Critical Assessment of the 
Existing European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision’, Brussel, 2014, p. 35. 
34 Council Directive (EU) No 2014/41 [2014] OJ L 130/1.  
35 Amuur v France (Application no. 19776/92) (1996) 22 EHRR 533, paras 50-54. 
feature detention, while other states can resort to less harsh sanctions. The inclusion of these 
situations in the concept of cases can significantly improve the content of the right to liberty in EU 
law. The same may hold true for the meaning of procedures. The doubt here involves the possible 
inclusion, in this requirement, of the procedures whereby deprivation of liberty is carried out after 
the apprehension of the person concerned: namely, the phase of enforcement. The first requirement 
of the right to liberty is that ‘everyone shall be deprived of liberty according to the procedures 
established by the law’. Once the individual has been placed in detention, s/he is still being 
deprived of liberty, and this requires that clear and accessible legal procedures be applied to this 
continuing deprivation.36 This means that penitentiary rules, and more in general detention 
conditions, can be really relevant to the right of liberty. This is testified by the case-law of the 
ECtHR, which sees detention conditions as a possible signifier of arbitrary detention, so resulting in 
a violation of the right to liberty.   
So far, I set the stage for the analysis of the mutual recognition instruments involving deprivation of 
liberty. Firstly, I argued that mutual recognition and mutual trust significantly streamlined inter-
state cooperation in criminal matters within the EU, so requiring major attention to the safeguards 
to protect the person concerned against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Secondly, I outlined the 
current content of the right to liberty in EU law, and introduced three main challenges that 
automaticity poses to this right: proportionality, legal certainty and scope of application. Now I 
shall discuss the FDs on: the EAW (and the CJEU’s interpretation thereof), transfer of prisoners, 
probation measures and the ESO. 
 
III. Mutual Recognition and the Right to Liberty in Secondary EU Law 
 
A. The EAW FD 
The EAW is the first and most prominent instrument of mutual recognition in EU criminal law,37 
aiming to replace extradition procedures with a smoother and swifter system of surrender between 
judicial authorities. The introduction of the EAW FD has been groundbreaking for a number of 
reasons: amongst others, the abolishment of the principle of dual criminality, the allocation of the 
responsibility for the surrender on judicial rather than political authorities, the (almost complete) 
drop of the prohibition for a state to extradite its own nationals. 
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Though the EAW was preceded by previous attempts to streamline inter-state judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters,38 the terroristic attack to the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 urged 
the Union to put into effect actual EU instruments to fight crime. This is confirmed by the 
circumstance that, before 9/11, the EAW was not the highest priority in the EU agenda on mutual 
recognition in criminal matters.39 The Commission, in its EAW FD Proposal, explicitly established 
a link by the FD and EU citizenship, with the latter status eroding the importance of nationality 
links even with regard to the surrender for detention purposes.40 The implementation of the EAW 
FD at the national level has known a difficult path,41 and Constitutional Courts across the EU had to 
rule on the compatibility of the EAW FD with their constitutional systems.42  
According to the wording of the FD, the EAW is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with 
a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes 
of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. While 
Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition,  the FD has not the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and 
fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU.43 
The final decision on the execution should be taken within 60 days after the arrest, which term can 
be postponed by further 30 days. The surrender must be carried no later than 10 days after the final 
decision.44 The executing judge must decide whether the person arrested must be kept in detention 
pending the decision on the recognition. Release may be ordered, provided that measures are taken 
so as to ensure that the person will not abscond.45 The issuing state must deduct the period of 
detention already served by the person from the total period of detention to be served therein.46  
                                                     
38 Article 66 of the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement refers to the possibility for Member States to extradite 
their nationals without extradition formalities (as long as the surrendered has agreed before a court and s/he has been informed on 
his/her right to the extradition procedure). Also the 1996 EU Convention on Extradition between Member States was aimed at 
limiting the possibility of application of the nationality ban. 
39 Concerning the factors leading to the prioritisation of the EAW, scholars also mention the adoption of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which distinguishes the state-to-state extradition from the surrender to the ICC, with the latter 
excluding the possibility of a nationality exception. 
40 However, this view has been strongly criticized. See in this respect F Impalà, ‘The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian Legal 
System. Between Mutual Recognition and Mutual Fear within the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2005) 1 (2) 
Utrecht Law Review 56.  
41 For a comparison between the English and France system, see J R Spencer, ‘Implementing the European Arrest Warrant: A Tale of 
How Not to Do It’ (2009) 30 (3) Statute Law Review 184. For a specific analysis of the Italian case, see L Marin, ‘The European 
Arrest Warrant in the Italian Republic’ (2008) 4 (2) European Constitutional Law Review 251. 
42 J Komárek , ‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search of the Limits of Contrapunctual Principles’ 
(2007) 44 (1) Common Market Law Review 9; Z Deen-Racsmány, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of Nationals 
Revisited: The Lessons of Constitutional Challenges' (2006) 14 (3) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 
271.  
43 See note 4 above, Article 1(3) and (2). 
44 Ibid, Articles 17, 23 and 24. 
45 Ibid, Article 12. 
46 Ibid, Article 26. 
With regard to the rights of the individual in the context of the procedures of recognition and 
execution, the FD provides the following. The person concerned has the right to be heard by the 
executing judge in accordance with the law of the executing Member State. In case of a EAW 
issued for prosecution, the executing judge must either agree that the requested person should be 
heard, or temporary transfer him/her to the issuing state. In the first case, the requested person must 
be heard by a judicial authority, assisted by another person designated in accordance with the law of 
the Member State of the requesting court. The requested person shall be heard in accordance with 
the law of the executing Member State and with the conditions determined by mutual agreement 
between the issuing and executing judicial authorities.47 In the latter situation, conditions and 
duration of the transfer are determined by the states involved, and the person must be able to return 
to the executing Member State to attend hearings concerning him or her as part of the surrender 
procedure.  
The FD provides that the recognition and execution of the EAW can be refused on the basis of 
mandatory and optional grounds for refusal of execution. Within the first category are included 
grounds such as the ne bis in idem, or the fact that the offence on which the EAW is based is 
covered by amnesty in the executing Member State.48 Article 4 establishes optional grounds for 
refusal, among which there is the possibility not to execute the EAW where ‘the requested person is 
staying in, or is a national or a resident of the executing Member State and that State undertakes to 
execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law’.49 
Having presented the main features of the EAW FD, now I move on to the interpretation given by 
the Court in three preliminary rulings relevant to the right to liberty. In Radu, the Court dealt with 
the possibility to refuse the execution of a EAW on the basis of fundamental rights violation (in 
particular, the breach of the right to liberty). In such a judgment, the CJEU denied that the EAW FD 
allows for such a possibility. The Lanigan case shows a different approach on the part of the Court, 
with higher attention being paid to individual rights. The CJEU clarified that the EAW FD must be 
interpreted in light of Articles 6 and 52 CFREU. The former provision lays down the right to liberty 
in EU law, whereas the latter stipulates that limitations of the Charter rights are subject to the 
principle of proportionality. The recent ruling issued by the Court in the Caldararu case revolved 
                                                     
47 Ibid, Article 18. 
48 Ibid, Article 3. 
49 This provision has given rise to a number of highly discussed preliminary rulings, on the part of the CJEU. See Proceedings 
concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued against Szymon Kozłowski, C-66/08, EU:C:2008:437; Dominic 
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Merkourios  84; C Janssen,  see note 10 above, pp. 207 onwards.  
around the thorny issue of detention conditions and mutual recognition. By this decision, the 
Luxembourg Court has opened the door to the non-execution of a EAW, should detention 
conditions in the issuing state prove to be capable of resulting in inhumane or degrading treatment. 
In the following section, I present these three judgments. Thereafter, I draw some preliminary 
conclusions on the EU approach to the relationship between the right to liberty, on the one hand, 
and the EAW and mutual recognition, on the other.   
 
B. Execution of EAW and Fundamental Rights 
The case-law of the CJEU on the EAW FD is conspicuous, and contributed to defining essential 
aspects of the functioning of this instruments. These decisions cover a broad spectrum of highly 
sensitive issues, such as the specialty rule, the principle of ne bis in idem, the right to appeal and 
fair trial.50 In three judgments, the Court has been faced with questions bearing a direct relevance to 
the right to liberty: refusal of execution of a EAW on the basis of breach of the right to liberty 
(Radu), the relevance of the right to liberty and proportionality to the interpretation of the EAW FD 
(Lanigan), the role of detention conditions in the EAW system (Caldararu).  
Radu regarded the issuance of EAWs against a Romanian national who claimed that his defence 
rights had been violated.51 The Court was asked as to whether the EAW must satisfy the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality, and its execution can be refused in case of (actual or 
potential) violations of Articles 5 and 6 ECHR or Articles 6, 48 and 52 CFREU. The AG recalled 
the arbitrariness test elaborated by the ECtHR (good faith; connection to detention relied on by the 
judicial authority; appropriate detention conditions; reasonably length). Furthermore, the AG 
suggested that the execution of a EAW may be refused on fundamental rights ground (in particular 
Articles 5 and 6 ECHR and/or Articles 6, 47 and 48 CFREU), but this could occur where ‘the 
deficiency or deficiencies in the trial process [are] such as fundamentally to destroy its fairness’52. 
Breaches that are remediable would not justify a refusal to transferring the requested person to the 
Member State where those rights are at risk. The Court, unlike the AG, paid very little attention to 
the right to liberty. Though acknowledging that the right to be heard is enshrined in Articles 47 and 
48 CFREU, it posed much more an emphasis on the ‘enforcement’ objectives of the EAW FD, and 
rejected the possibility, for the executing judge, to refuse the execution of a EAW on fundamental 
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51 Proceedings relating to the execution of European arrest warrants issued against Ciprian Vasile Radu, C-396/11, EU:C:2013:39. 
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rights ground.53 Admittedly, Mr Radu argued that his rights had been violated because he had not 
been summoned by the issuing judge before the EAW was issued. On the other hand, the question 
posed by the referring court had to do, more broadly, with the possibility to refuse the execution of 
a EAW on the basis of a fundamental rights breach. Granted, references for preliminary rulings 
always arise from a concrete case, and the violation of fundamental rights in the case of Mr Radu 
could be questioned. Unlike the AG, the Court seemed to completely close the door, at least at that 
moment, to considering breaches of fundamental rights as a basis for refusing the execution of a 
EAW. 
In Lanigan, the questions referred concerned the interpretation of Article 17, read in conjunction 
with Article 15, and Article 12 EAW FD. Articles 17 and 15 establish procedures and time-limits 
for the decision on the execution of a EAW, whereas Article 12 provides for the possibility, for the 
executing judge, to order the provisional release of the person concerned during execution 
procedures.54 The doubts raised by the national court had to do with: the effects deriving from the 
executing Member State’s failure to comply with the time-limits; the possibility to envisage a right 
for the person to be released, in light of that failure. The Court found that the expiring of the time-
limits neither precludes the execution of the EAW, nor creates a general and unconditional 
obligation to release the person. Such an interpretation ‘could limit the effectiveness of the 
surrender system put in place by the Framework Decision and, consequently, obstruct the 
attainment of the objectives pursued by it’.55 Once again, the Court placed a strong emphasis on 
effectiveness. However, the CJEU found that Article 1(3) determines an obligation to interpret the 
EAW FD in compliance with the Charter. As far as that specific case was concerned, the relevant 
provisions to take into account were Articles 6 and 52 CFREU.56 As for the right to liberty, the 
CJEU relied on the ECtHR’s case-law on Article 5(1)(f) ECHR (which, however, refers to the right 
to liberty in the context of extradition procedures). In particular, the right to liberty would result in 
the duty, for the executing judge, to hold that person in custody so long as the procedure for the 
execution are carried out in a sufficiently diligent manner. In order to ensure that this is the case, the 
executing judge is required to consider factors such as: the possible failure to act on the part of the 
authorities of the Member States concerned; any contribution of the requested person to that 
duration; the sentence potentially faced by the requested person; the potential risk of that person 
absconding; the fact that the requested person has been held in custody for a period the total of 
which greatly exceeds the time-limits stipulated in Article 17. Should the judge opt for release, s/he 
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55 Ibid, para 50. 
56 Ibid, paras 53 onwards. 
should adopt any measures to ensure that the material conditions necessary for the surrender remain 
fulfilled. Article 52(1) CFREU requires that limitations of Charter rights be provided for by law, 
respect the essence of those rights and, subject to the principle of proportionality, be necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest. The Lanigan judgment is important, as it reveals 
higher consideration for the right to liberty and the principle of proportionality, on the part of the 
Court of Justice. 
A further step forward towards a more balanced interpretation of the EAW FD has been taken by 
the Court in the Caldararu judgment, where the CJEU had to deal with the possibility to refuse the 
execution of a EAW on the basis of the risk of inhumane treatment in the issuing Member States 
(Romania and Hungary), due to poor detention conditions.57 The AG’s Opinion was characterised 
by heavy reliance on the principle of mutual trust. The AG stated that introducing a systematic 
ground for refusal, based on the risk that the person concerned will be subject to inhumane 
detention conditions in the issuing state, would undermine the mutual trust that founds judicial 
cooperation within the EU. Article 19 CFREU and recital 13 EAW FD state that ‘No person should 
be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be 
subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. By 
not mentioning the surrender, these provisions would reveal the intention, of the Union legislature, 
to leave the EAW system outside their scope of application. The Union legislature, when 
establishing the grounds for refusal enumerated in the FD, did not provide for refusal of execution 
based on violations of fundamental rights. The application of a systematic check on detention 
conditions, performed by the executing judge, would be incompatible with the principle of mutual 
trust, according to which Member States are presumed to respect fundamental rights.  
To this end, the issuing and executing states have a key role to preserving that trust and the 
functioning of mutual recognition. On the one hand, and except for the cases laid down in Articles 3 
to Article 4a, the executing judge is to surrender the person even if the provisions of its national 
law, including constitutional ones, would provide a higher level of protection of fundamental 
rights.58 What the executing judge can (has to) do in case of systemic deficiencies is assessing, 
through an exchange of information with the issuing judge, whether the person will be detained in 
proportionate conditions. On being a general principle of EU law, proportionality could be relied on 
to refuse the execution of a EAW. Detention conditions would be proportionate where: they do not 
result ‘in the detachment from society of the person concerned’, in the case of a EAW issued for 
execution purpose; they remain strictly related to the aim of prosecution, in the case of a EAW 
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issued for that purpose. The issuing judge, on its part, is called on to apply a proportionality check, 
and issue a EAW by taking into account the nature of the offence and the regime of execution. 
Broadly, the issuing Member State should take all necessary measures, including reforms of 
criminal policy, to ensure that that person serves his/her sentence in conditions which respect 
fundamental rights.  
The Court decided differently from the AG, by according Article 1(3) a major role for fundamental 
rights protection. The CJEU found that Article 1(3) obliges Member States to respect the 
prohibition of inhumane and degrading treatment, as stated in Article 4 CFREU. This implies that, 
where the executing judge has objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence showing 
that there are deficiencies, which may be ‘systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain 
groups of people, or which may affect certain place of detention, with respect to detention 
conditions in the issuing Member State’, that judge must, pursuant to Article 15(2) EAW FD, 
request that the issuing judge provide supplementary information (emphasis added). The evidence 
at the basis of the request under Article 15(2) may be obtained from, inter alia, ‘judgments of 
international courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the issuing Member 
State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe 
or under the aegis of the UN’. The decision on the surrender must be postponed until supplementary 
information are obtained, allowing it to exclude the risk of inhumane treatment. Should that risk 
cannot be discounted within a reasonable time, the executing judge is to decide whether the 
surrender procedure should be brought to an end. Meanwhile, the person concerned should be held 
in custody only in so far as the duration of the detention is not excessive, on the basis of the 
requirement of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter.59  
 
C. Proportionality and Detention Conditions in the Right to Liberty 
The EAW FD and the interpretation of the CJEU have important implications in terms of the right 
to liberty. In Radu, the Court rejected the possibility not to execute a EAW on fundamental rights 
ground. The Lanigan and Caldararu judgments improve the protection of the individual. Firstly, it 
is clarified that the EAW FD is to be interpreted in light of the right to liberty and Article 52 
CFREU, which makes restrictions of the Charter rights conditional upon the proportionality 
principle. Secondly, the execution of a EAW must be deferred – or even abandoned – where there 
are serious reasons to believe that detention conditions in the issuing state would expose the person 
concerned to the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. 
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Three main issues related to the right to liberty emerge from the EAW FD and its interpretation on 
the part of the CJEU: the refusal of execution of a EAW on fundamental rights ground; the 
application of the proportionality test; the role of poor detention conditions in the issuing state. As 
for the first issue, the Court was rather reluctant to admit such a possibility in earlier judgments, but 
the latest development in the case-law has increasingly opened the door to it. I submit that it is EU 
law that authorises the refusal on fundamental rights ground. Even though fundamental rights 
violations are not included in the possible grounds for refusal enumerated in the EAW FD, Article 
1(3) explicitly states that the FD has not the effect of modifying Member States’ obligation under 
Article 6 TEU. In other words, the Member States cannot apply the FD, where the latter would 
result in a fundamental rights violation. Furthermore, the CJEU has explicitly affirmed that EU 
secondary law should not be implemented, where this can bring about the breach of a general 
principle of EU law or a Charter right.60  
Also the possible application of the principle of proportionality in the context of the EAW has been 
largely debated.61 For what concerns primarily the right to liberty, I argue that the proportionality 
test should be applied by the executing Member State, when deciding whether or not holding the 
person in detention. Indeed, it is the executing judge that firstly decides on deprivation of liberty. 
The test would always apply. It constitutes a preliminary requirement of any limitations of the 
Charter rights (then also the right to liberty) under Article 52 CFREU, and should relate the 
proportionality of opting for detention to the aim of ensuring the enforcement of the EAW. To this 
end, circumstances such as the seriousness of the offence, the time of its (alleged) commission, as 
well as the personal situation of the person concerned in the executing Member State (in terms of 
family, working and social links), should be taken into account. 
Detention conditions constitute a thorny issue as well, as shown by the recent CJEU’s judgment in 
Caldararu.62 Both the case-laws of the ECtHR and the CJEU have acknowledged that poor 
detention conditions may result in violations of fundamental rights.63 The traditional legal reference 
in this respect is Article 3 ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. 
However, this requires a high threshold to be met, and the case may be that bad detention conditions 
are too poor to be lawful, but not poor enough for invoking Article 3 ECHR.64 Another legal anchor 
is needed, in order to better protect individual rights. I submit that this anchor is the right to liberty. 
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The ECtHR has stated that detention conditions can be symptom of a possible violation of Article 5 
ECHR.65 The requirement that one shall be deprived of liberty according to the procedures 
established by the law means that, until deprivation of liberty is ongoing, the legal procedures are to 
be abided by. This regards in particular the rules on the enforcement. Poor detention conditions may 
not violate Article 3 ECHR, but be unlawful and create a situation of arbitrariness all the same, so 
giving rise to breach of the right to liberty. The Caldararu judgment could have far-reaching 
consequences in this respect. Firstly, the CJEU established a link between Article 1(3) EAW FD 
and the obligation to respect fundamental rights in relation to the execution of a EAW. The Court 
explicitly opened to the non-implementation of EU law, in case of risk of fundamental rights 
violation. Granted, what was at stake in Caldararu was an absolute prohibition, such as that 
enshrined in Article 4 CFREU. Other fundamental rights can be balanced, as is the case of the right 
to fair trial. One could not expect the application of the Caldararu test to any fundamental right 
violations. Probably, the Court will have the opportunity to clarify the actual reach of the principles 
stated in this judgment. This nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that Article 1(3) EAW FD can 
give the basis for limiting the implementation of mutual recognition. Furthermore, the conditions 
set out by the Court for the request of supplementary information (which may in turn lead to 
postponement and non-execution of the EAW) are not cumulative, as the deficiencies can be 
systemic or affect certain groups of people or places of detention. The question arises as to what 
consequences this can have for the right to liberty. The right to liberty can indeed be limited, as 
shown by the cases of lawful detention enumerated in Article 5(1) ECHR. However, deprivation of 
liberty is not lawful for the mere fact that it is carried out in one of the cases provided for in the 
ECHR. It has to be not arbitrary. The ECtHR test revealed that inappropriate detention conditions 
can result in a situation of arbitrariness and, therefore, a violation of Article 5 ECHR. It is helpful to 
recall that the instant case was a very particular one, revolving around an absolute prohibition such 
as that of Article 4 CFREU. However, nothing in the Court’s judgment precludes the application of 
the Caldararu test to those situations of unlawfulness that violates the right to liberty, while not 
meeting the threshold of Article 4 CFREU. 
From the interaction between the proportionality test and the right to liberty as outlined above, it 
seems rather safe to assume that the executing judge should take into account detention conditions 
in: the executing state, when it comes to decide as to whether detaining the person concerned during 
EAW procedures; the issuing state, where the execution of the EAW and the surrender of the 
individual are at stake.  
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The present discussion paves the way to the analysis of the FDs on the transfer of prisoners, the 
probation measures and the ESO. Firstly, I stress the lack of procedural rights in the context of 
procedures resulting in deprivation of liberty. Secondly, I highlight that the application of mutual 
recognition to criminal matters requires a reconsideration of the right to liberty in EU law. In 
particular, the condition that deprivation of liberty is to be carried out in the (1) cases and (2) 
procedures established by the law should lead to rethinking the content of these two concepts. 
 
D. The FDs on the Transfer of Prisoners, Probation Measures and the ESO 
The three FDs on the transfer of prisoners, probation measures and pre-trial measures alternative to 
detention are particularly relevant to the right to liberty.66 They all result in deprivation of liberty 
(the coercive transfer) of the person concerned, once the judicial decision at stake has been 
recognised. After the transfer is completed, the individual will be subject to a new legal regime, 
which will differ from that of the issuing state, with the possibility of different rules concerning the 
substantive basis for detention and the procedural measures for deprivation of liberty. For example, 
the breach of a pre or post trial measure alternative to detention may have differing penalties in 
each member state. Procedures for the deprivation of liberty, concerning the enforcement of 
detention, the penitentiary regime and detention conditions, may also vary significantly. The FDs 
lay down no guarantees to ensure that each individual is adequately informed of the potential 
alteration in the content of their right to liberty. 
The FD on the transfer of prisoners creates a mechanism of mutual recognition of custodial 
sentences and judgments involving deprivation of liberty between Member States. When the 
judgment is recognised by the executing Member State, the prisoner is consequently transferred 
therein. The purpose of the FD is to increase prisoners’ chances of rehabilitation. However, in the 
preamble it is stated that the consent of the person concerned should no longer be dominant, for the 
purposes of recognition and enforcement of the sentence imposed.67 The FD has not the effect of 
modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as 
enshrined in Article 6 TEU.68 The person can be transferred even where s/he has not provided the 
consent, where the executing Member State is: the Member State of nationality in which the 
sentenced person lives; where the sentenced person will be deported, once s/he is released from the 
enforcement of the sentence on the basis of an expulsion or deportation consequential to the 
judgment; where the sentenced person has fled or otherwise returned in view of the criminal 
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proceedings pending against him or her in the issuing State or following the conviction in that 
issuing State. In the absence of the possibility to give his/her consent, the person concerned is 
provided with a generic ‘opportunity’ to express his/her opinion, which in turn must be taken into 
account.69 However, the FD lays down no rules to ensure an appropriate level of participation of the 
person concerned in the procedures of recognition and execution.  
The FD on probation measures provides for the application of mutual recognition to judgments and 
probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and sanctions alternative 
to deprivation of liberty.70 The aim of the FD is enhancing the prospects of the sentenced person’s 
being reintegrated into society and improving monitoring of compliance with probation measures 
and alternative sanctions.71 The FD involves the recognition of judgments and probation measures, 
and the consequent transfer of responsibility for the supervision of probation measures and 
alternative sanctions from the issuing to the executing Member State. The issuing State may 
forward a decision to the state where the sentenced person is lawfully and ordinarily residing, when 
the sentenced person has returned or wants to return to that State. The law applicable is that of the 
executing Member State, which has the jurisdiction to decide on: modification of the measure; 
revocation of the suspension of the execution of the judgment or revocation of conditional release; 
the imposition of a measure involving deprivation of liberty.72 If so requested, the executing State 
shall inform the issuing State of the maximum duration of deprivation of liberty foreseen in the 
executing State for the offence that could be imposed in case of breach of the probation measure or 
alternative sanction.73 The executing State shall immediately notify of any finding which may bring 
about the revocation of the alternative measure, or the imposition of a measure involving 
deprivation of liberty. Also in this case, the FD provides no rights or rules on the participation of 
the person concerned in the procedures of recognition and transfer. 
The ESO FD establishes a system of recognition of supervision measures alternative to detention. 
Studies have showed that Member States’ judicial authority are rather reluctant to provide persons 
not living therein with bail. This is mainly due to the circumstance that those persons have not 
stable residence or address in that Member State. These individuals are consequently placed in pre-
trial detention when national or resident would not, in a comparable situation. This creates a state of 
play in which there are two alternative choices at disposal of Member States’ judiciary: provisional 
                                                     
69 Ibid, Article 6. 
70 For a historical analysis, see S Neveu, ‘Probation Measures and Alternative Sanctions in Europe: From the 1964 Convention to the 
2008 Framework Decision’ (2013) 4 (1-2) New Journal of European Criminal Law 134. 
71 See note 6 above, recital 8. 
72 For consideration on probation in Europe, see I Durnescu, ‘The future of probation in Europe: Common in the middle and diverse 
at the edge’ (2013) 60 (3) Probation Journal 316; I Durnescu and B Stout, ‘A European approach to probation training: An 
investigation into the competencies required’ (2011) 58 (4) Probation Journal 395. 
73 See note 6 above, Articles 13-16. 
detention or unsupervised movement. In most cases, the national judges opt for deprivation of 
liberty. However, the persons affected by this framework have not been tried. Therefore, the right to 
liberty and the presumption of innocence of a great deal of EU citizens (and not only) are posed 
under threat throughout the EU.74 To address this thorny issue, the EU has adopted a FD on the 
mutual recognition of decisions on supervision measures alternative to provisional detention. The 
ESO FD has a twofold aim: monitoring the defendants’ movements; enhancing the right to liberty 
and the presumption of innocence of the persons concerned.75 Should the person concerned not 
return to the issuing State voluntarily, he or she may be surrendered to the issuing State in 
accordance with the EAW FD, so that the latter provisions apply.  
The FD does not confer any right on the person to the use, in the course of criminal proceedings, of 
a non-custodial measure. A decision on supervision measures may be forwarded to the Member 
State where the person is lawfully and ordinarily residing, so long as s/he consents to return to that 
State. The law applicable is the law of the executing Member State.76 The issuing State has the 
competence on all subsequent decisions relating to a decision on supervision measures, and in 
particular: the renewal, review, withdrawal, modification of the supervision of the measures; the 
issuing of an arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect.77 The 
issuing Member State must be immediately informed of any finding which can lead to the adoption 
of any of those measures. If the competent authority of the issuing State has issued a EAW or any 
other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect, the person shall be surrendered in 
accordance with the EAW FD. 
In this section, I have briefly outlined the main features of the FDs on the transfer of prisoners, 
probation measures and pre-trial measures alternative to detention. I have highlighted the relevance 
of these instruments to the right to liberty from a twofold point of view. Firstly, they all entail 
deprivation of liberty of the person concerned, due to the transfer from the issuing to the executing 
Member State. Secondly, the lack of clear rules concerning the participation of the individual in the 
procedures of recognition emerges. This is highly relevant to the right to liberty not only because 
the individual can be subject to the coercive transfer. The transfer to another state results in the 
application of rules possibly different from those of the issuing state, with regard to cases and 
procedures of deprivation of liberty. In the following, I argue that the minor involvement of the 
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individual in procedures of recognition can significantly affect the awareness of how his/her right to 
liberty can be limited in the executing state.  
 
 
E. The Right to Liberty and Coercive Movement of People within the EU 
In the discussion concerning the EAW, I threw in relief the importance of proportionality and poor 
detention conditions to the right to liberty in the context of mutual recognition. The three FDs just 
analysed bring to the fore other significant aspects concerning the relationship between the right to 
liberty, and the higher level of automaticity in inter-state cooperation in criminal matters introduced 
by mutual recognition. In the following, I shall present two key points: the inadequate level of 
individual rights in procedures that give rise to deprivation of liberty; the lack of legal certainty 
concerning possible cases and procedures of deprivation of liberty that can arise on the basis of the 
application of these FDs.  
 
1. Procedural Rights of the Individuals 
With regard to the lack of procedural guarantees in the context of procedures of mutual recognition, 
the FD on the transfer of prisoners seems to be the most problematic. It removes the consent of the 
person concerned for the purposes of the transfer, in particular where the executing State is where 
the person lives or where s/he should be returned on the basis of an expulsion order.78 The FD 
establishes only that the opinion of the person concerned must be taken into account. Furthermore, 
the FD is completely silent as to the procedures to be followed when adopting the decision on the 
transfer: no individual rights are provided for in this respect. The FD on probation measures and the 
ESO FD are ‘triggered’ at request of the person concerned. Also in these cases the individual will 
be subject to deprivation of liberty, as s/he will be transferred to the executing Member State. 
However, these instruments do not ensure an adequate level of participation of the person 
concerned in the procedures of recognition. What emerges from the analysis of the three FDs is a 
sharp contrast in individual rights protection between criminal proceedings, on the one hand, and 
mutual recognition procedures, on the other. Mutual recognition procedures have uncertain nature: 
they cannot be considered part of criminal proceedings, but have significant impact on personal 
liberty all the same. The EU has adopted three directives on (1) translation and interpretation,79 (2) 
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information80 and (3) the access to the lawyer in criminal proceedings.81 As scope of application, 
the Directives lay down rules concerning these rights (1) in criminal proceedings and (2) 
proceedings for the execution of a EAW.82 Therefore, the EU legislature acknowledges the 
difference between these two kinds of procedures. These instruments are aimed to reduce the 
existing distance of standard of protection between criminal proceedings, on the one hand, and the 
EAW, on the other. Unfortunately, this improvement has not involved the other three FDs. 
However, they have significant implications in terms of the right to liberty as well, so that there is 
no good reason for this discrepancy in terms of individual guarantees. 
This uneven state of play is worsened by the problems arising with regard to the right to liberty and 
legal certainty, which I shall deal with in the next sub-section.  
 
2. Legal Certainty  
In terms of legal certainty, the FDs leave much to be desired. However, this article is on the impact 
of mutual recognition on the right to liberty, so that I shall highlight the criticality concerning this 
specific right.  
The FDs on probation measures and pre-trial measures alternative to detention stipulate that the 
decision on the recognition is to be taken within 60 days. However, they also provide that this time-
limit may not be complied with, where exceptional circumstances occur.83 No further deadlines are 
laid down, so that the transfer of the person concerned can be suspended sine die.84 This is highly 
problematic. As shown, the ESO FD usually applies where the person concerned is in pre-trial 
detention just for not being in his/her country of residence. The transfer to the executing state would 
be conducive to setting him/her at free. The same logic underlies the FD on probation measures. 
Allowing for continuing detention of the individual on a very broadly-worded legal basis 
(exceptional circumstances), without a term for a decision being set, could be highly detrimental to 
the right to liberty.  
The impact of these instruments on the right to liberty involves also the lack of legal certainty with 
regard to cases and procedures of deprivation of liberty. To this end, the ECtHR has clarified that 
the right to liberty presupposes legal certainty: the law authorising and regulating deprivation of 
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liberty is to be of sufficient quality. The automaticity introduced by mutual recognition in inter-state 
cooperation in criminal matters calls for deeper application of the requirement that deprivation of 
liberty take place in the cases and according to the procedures established by the law. In the 
previous sub-section, I highlighted the relevance of the FDs to the right to liberty, since they result 
in the coercive transfer of the person. The following asymmetry can be discerned. On the one hand, 
the FDs confer upon the states the power to deprive a person of liberty; on the other, the procedures 
on the basis of which this deprivation should be carried out, as well the participation of the 
individual in these procedures, are not regulated at all.  
The phase that follows the transfer to the executing state is not less problematic. Once the transfer is 
completed, the person will be subject to a different legal regime. This regards both the cases and the 
procedures of detention. The cases of deprivation of liberty are understood as situations that can 
lawfully give rise to deprivation of liberty. For instance, the executing state can feature stricter rules 
than the issuing state in case of breach of a pre or post trial measure alternative to detention, and 
sanction these infringements with deprivation of liberty (as a punishment or more severe pre-trial 
measure). The lack of involvement of the person in the procedures of recognition can seriously 
affect awareness of these aspects, capable of resulting in deprivation of liberty. Such uncertainty 
involves also the procedures of detention, and in particular the phase of enforcement. As clarified at 
the outset of this paper, the requirement that deprivation of liberty be carried out according to the 
procedures established by the law logically includes the phase that follows the apprehension of the 
person concerned. So long as deprivation of liberty is ongoing, clear legal procedures are to be 
established and abided by. In this context, significant difference of procedures can regard especially 
the penitentiary regime in the executing Member State. This is particularly problematic as far as the 
FD on the transfer of prisoner is concerned, since this instrument provides for the transfer of the 
person even without his/her consent. The FDs allow for and regulate – to a very little extent – 
deprivation of liberty and transfer of the person concerned, on the one hand. On the other, they 
provide no guarantees that the individual is made aware of his/her rights with regard to transfer 
procedures, as well as the difference of legal regimes that can affect his/her right to liberty. This has 
to do with those situations that can give rise to deprivation of liberty, and the way in which 
deprivation of liberty is enforced in the executing state. 
One could object that the rules are still provided at national level, so that EU law would not be 
involved in such considerations. It is for national laws to determine the rules regarding prison 
regimes, or the consequences of breach of probation measures.85 However, the person concerned is 
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subject to a different legal framework after s/he has been forcedly transferred to another Member 
State. That transfer is based on a procedure regulated by EU law; a procedure in which the person 
concerned has no specific rights or guarantees. Either by directly providing for deprivation of 
liberty (e.g. the coercive transfer), or giving the basis for further and different deprivation (rules on 
pre and post-trial measures), these EU law instruments are undeniably relevant to the right to 
liberty, and create an unbalanced legal framework at the expenses of individual rights. 
 
IV. Final Remarks 
This article discussed the relationship between the right to liberty in EU law and the application of 
mutual recognition to criminal matters. In particular, I analysed the possible impact that four FDs 
can have on the right to liberty. Namely, the FDs on the EAW, the transfer of prisoners, the 
probations measures, the pre-trial measures alternative to detention. The main claim is that the high 
level of automaticity in judicial cooperation introduced by mutual recognition requires an 
appropriate and better balance between effectiveness of judicial cooperation and individual 
guarantees. The right to liberty in EU law is protected by Article 6 CFREU, which has the same 
meaning and scope as Article 5 ECHR, as resulting from the interpretation of the ECtHR. This right 
to liberty requires that deprivation of liberty be carried out in the cases and according to the 
procedures established by the law. This implies the need for legal certainty: the law is not to be 
framed in such a way as to provide the authorities with an unbounded power. I argue that the cases 
of deprivation of liberty should include all those situations capable of resulting in deprivation of 
liberty, such as breach of probation measures. The procedures logically involve also the 
enforcement of deprivation of liberty, in particular detention conditions and penitentiary regimes. 
This is confirmed by the test elaborated by the Strasbourg Court, according to which deprivation of 
liberty in the context of inter-state cooperation in criminal matters is lawful where it is: carried out 
in good faith; closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the executing judicial 
authority; enforced in appropriate place and conditions; reasonably lengthy in relation to the 
purposes pursued.  
When it comes to assess the right to liberty in the context of mutual recognition procedures, the 
fundamental right provision referred to by the EU’s institutions is Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. However, 
the ECtHR’s interpretation thereof poses three main problems: that test regards extradition, which is 
rather different from mutual recognition; it provides for no requirements in terms of proportionality 
and necessity of detention, but only that extradition procedures be ongoing and carried out with due 
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diligence; detention in the context of extradition has been granted a lower standard of protection 
than e. g. detention on remand. The EU at legislative, and judicial, levels stated that mutual 
recognition procedures (and the EAW in particular) may not be considered a mere variant of 
extradition. For all these reasons one could call into question the choice of Article 5(1)(f) as the 
suitable fundamental right reference for the right to liberty in the context of mutual recognition.  
To this end, the Court’s approach to the right to liberty has improved over the years. Even though 
the CJEU initially denied the possibility not to execute a EAW in case of breach of the right to 
liberty, the Court has then stated the need for interpreting the EAW FD in light of Articles 6 (the 
right to liberty) and 52 (the principle of proportionality) CFREU. Furthermore, the Luxembourg 
judge has recently opened the door to the non-execution of a EAW on the basis of inhumane or 
degrading detention conditions: namely, for violations of Article 3 ECHR. Against this background, 
in this paper, I argued the following. The proportionality test should always be applied by (at least) 
the executing judge to the decision on the detention of the person concerned, while the procedures 
of recognition and execution of the EAW are ongoing. Poor detention conditions that are not able to 
reach the threshold required by Article 3 ECHR, but result in a situation of arbitrary detention all 
the same, should lead to the non-implementation of mutual recognition. It would be so on the basis 
of the violation of the right to liberty. As for the assessment of detention conditions in the issuing 
state, the Caldararu test would be applicable. Firstly, the executing judge could rely on evidence 
provided by international and state courts, as well as reports of bodies under the CoE or the United 
Nations. Secondly, the judge could ask for additional information to the issuing judge, and decide 
on the possible postponement and/or non execution of the EAW. 
These two arguments would be valid also for the other three FDs analysed. They explicitly allow 
for and regulate deprivation of liberty. They establish procedures which imply deprivation of 
liberty (e.g. to operate the transfer of the person concerned). Due to those procedures and the 
transfer, the person concerned may be faced with adverse and unknown consequences, such as 
harsher penitentiary regimes or sanctions ensuing from the infringement of pre and post trial 
measures alternative to detention. However, the FDs lack rules concerning the participation of the 
person concerned in the procedures of recognition and execution. The distance between rights in 
criminal proceedings and in mutual recognition procedures has been reduced with regard to the 
EAW, thanks to the three procedural rights Directives. However, such an uneven legal framework 
remains, as far as the other three FDs are concerned.  
The prison regime, or the consequences attached to the violation of a probation/supervision measure 
in the executing Member State, are strictly related to EU law. The person concerned would face 
such adverse consequences in light of a procedure established at Union level. Those procedures are 
vague and confers no rights upon the individuals. The high degree of automaticity introduced by the 
principle of mutual recognition increases such criticality, and significantly reduces the margin of 
intervention of the person concerned. In conclusion, mutual recognition has currently a 
preoccupying impact on the right to liberty in EU law: the role of the principle of proportionality is 
not clear at all, legal certainty on cases and procedures of deprivation of liberty is challenged by 
secondary EU law, and the position of the individual in procedures seriously affecting his/her right 
to liberty does not ensure an adequate standard of protection. 
